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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order granting Daily’s motion to
suppress evidence recovered during a traffic stop, and from the district court’s denial of
the state’s motion for reconsideration.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
In May 2016 Nez Perce County Deputy Sheriff Lucas Martin observed a pickup
truck fail to stop at a stop sign and fail to signal when turning at an intersection. (Tr., p.8,
Ls.6-13; p.12, L.12 – p.13, L.8.) Deputy Martin effectuated a traffic stop, approached the
pickup truck, and identified the driver as Jordan Daily. (Tr., p.13, L.16 – p.15, L.5.)
Deputy Martin observed Daily look for his relevant vehicle documents in the glove box.
(Tr., p.16, Ls.15-19.)
As he was talking to Daily at the truck, Deputy Martin observed what appeared to
be an open can of an alcoholic beverage in the front seat console cup holder of the
vehicle. (Tr., p.15, L.14 – p.16, L.10.) Deputy Martin returned to his patrol vehicle to
run a license and warrants check on Daily. (Tr., p.17, Ls.7-22.) Dispatch informed
Deputy Martin that Daily had a confirmed arrest warrant for failing to appear, and that his
driver’s license was suspended. (Tr., p.17, L.23 – p.18, L.13.) While these checks were
being conducted, Deputy Martin observed Daily moving inside the truck, reaching over
towards the passenger side of the front seat, and putting something in the back seat. (Tr.,
p.18, L.14 – p.19, L.4; p.20, L.17 – p.21, L.5.) Deputy Martin requested that another
officer be called to the scene. (Tr., p.19, L.12 – p.20, L.3.)
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When the other officer arrived, Deputy Martin arrested Daily on the warrant and
secured him in his patrol vehicle. (Tr., p.21, Ls.6-22.) Deputy Martin returned to Daily’s
truck, took the can from the center console, and observed that it was open, smelled like
alcohol, and was cold to the touch. (Tr., p.21, L.23 – p.23, L.8; p.24, Ls.10-12.) Deputy
Martin then began a search of the truck for any other open containers of alcohol, and
found several empty or near-empty alcohol containers in the back seat area. (Tr., p.23,
L.9 – p.24, L.22.)
Because he had previously found open containers of alcohol in glove boxes,
Deputy Martin searched Daily’s truck’s glove box. (Tr., p.25, Ls.2-12.) Even though
Deputy Martin had, earlier in the traffic stop, observed Daily search for documents in the
glove box, the glove box was now locked. (Tr., p.25, Ls.13-15.)

Deputy Martin

unlocked the glove box with Daily’s keys and discovered a needle syringe containing a
“cloudy clear” substance that Deputy Martin believed to be methamphetamine. (Tr.,
p.25, L.16 – p.26, L.6.) Deputy Martin also recovered, from the glove box, several small
baggies of a powdery substance that Deputy Martin believed to be methamphetamine, a
digital scale, and other drug paraphernalia. (Tr., p.26, L.15 – p.28, L.18.) Deputy Martin
advised Daily of his Miranda rights, and Daily told him that he was a drug addict and that
everything in the vehicle was his. (Tr., p.28, L.25 – p.29, L.8.) The state charged Daily
with felony possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.58-59.)
Daily filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle and all
statements made following the search. (R., pp.65-72.) Daily argued that while the
officers had lawful authority to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle after
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discovering the open alcohol container in plain view, the search of the locked glove box
was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. (Id.)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the state presented testimony from
Deputy Martin and the dash cam video from the traffic stop. (Tr., p.7, Ls.14-20; p.7, L.23
– p.42, L.14; p.57, Ls.5-13; State’s Exhibit 1.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the state
argued that the search of the glove box was justified by the automobile exception and
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. (Tr., p.43, L.1 – p.47,
L.10.)
In a written order, the district court granted Daily’s motion to suppress. (R.,
pp.86-91.) The court concluded: (1) that Deputy Martin lacked probable cause to search
the glove box and that the search was therefore not justified by the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement; and (2) the search incident to arrest exception was
inapplicable to the case pursuant to Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), because Daily
was secured in the back of the patrol car and was no longer able to access his vehicle
when the search took place. (R., pp.88-90.) The court also denied the state’s subsequent
motion for reconsideration. (R., pp.94-101, 122-125.) While the district court’s order on
the motion for reconsideration was pending, the state filed a notice of appeal that was
timely from the district court’s order granting Daily’s motion to suppress. 1 (R., pp.107110.)

1

The state’s motion for reconsideration did not extend the time to file an appeal because
it was not filed within 14 days of the order granting Daily’s motion to suppress. I.A.R.
14(a). However, the notice of appeal was timely filed within 42 days of the district
court’s order granting Daily’s motion to suppress. Id.
3

ISSUE
Did the district court err by granting Daily’s motion to suppress and by denying
the state’s motion for reconsideration?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Granting Daily’s Motion To Suppress And By Denying The
State’s Motion For Reconsideration
A.

Introduction
The district court granted Daily’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a

traffic stop.

(R., pp.86-91.)

Specifically, the court concluded that the automobile

exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the officers’ search of the glove box
in Daily’s vehicle. 2 (R., pp.88-89.) A review of the record and applicable law reveals
that the district court erred by applying an erroneous legal standard. Specifically, the
district court erred in concluding that the state was required to demonstrate separate
probable cause to search the glove box even after Deputy Martin already located
contraband in plain view during the traffic stop. Pursuant to the correct legal standard,
Deputy Martin’s lawful discovery of the open container permitted the officers to search
any portion of the vehicle where additional contraband may reasonably be found,
including the glove box.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found.” State v. Colvin, 157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598,
599 (Ct. App. 2014).

2

The state does not challenge the district court’s conclusion regarding the inapplicability,
in this case, of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
5

C.

The District Court Erred By Granting Daily’s Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.

“A

warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain special and
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870,
873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
454-55 (1971); see
also ----------State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App.
- --1999)).

One such exception is the “automobile exception,” which authorizes a

warrantless search of a vehicle and the containers therein when there is probable cause to
believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity. California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982);
State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999); State v. Yeoumans, 144
Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,
281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005). “Probable cause is established if the facts
available to the officer at the time of the search would warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that the area or items to be searched contained contraband or
evidence of a crime.” Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148 (citing Ross, 456
U.S. at 823).
When an officer observes contraband in plain view inside a vehicle, the officer is
justified under the automobile exception in searching the vehicle for additional
contraband, as long as the scope of the search is limited to “only those places where such
contraband might reasonably be found.”

State v. Anderson, No. 41730, 2015 WL

7204541, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. November 17, 2015); see also State v. Gallegos, 120
Idaho 894, 895, 821 P.2d 949, 950 (1991) (rejecting Gallegos’ proposition that there is a
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distinction between probable cause to believe that contraband is somewhere in a vehicle
and probable cause to believe that contraband is located in a particular container in the
vehicle, and holding that the officer lawfully searched a container found underneath the
spare tire after a drug dog alerted on the vehicle); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281, 108 P.3d at
428 (“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully-stopped vehicle, it justifies the
search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-825 (1982)
(“[w]hen a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been
precisely defined, nice distinctions between ... glove compartments, upholstered seats,
trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in
the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.”). Therefore, an officer is not
required, under the Fourth Amendment, 3 to establish separate probable cause to search
any particular portion of a vehicle after contraband has already been lawfully located in
the same vehicle. Instead, once it is established that a vehicle contains contraband, an
officer may search any portion of the vehicle, including the containers within, where
“such contraband might reasonably be found” or which “may conceal the object of the
search.”
In Anderson, an officer stopped a vehicle for a driving infraction. Anderson,
2015 WL 7204541 at *1. The officer observed a brown paper bag located near the center
console, and Anderson admitted to the officer that the bag contained an open container of
alcohol. Id. The officer then searched the vehicle and found controlled substances near

3

Daily did not argue, and the district court did not conclude, that the Idaho Constitution
provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in contexts applicable to this
case. (See R., pp.65-72, 86-91, 102-105, 122-125.)
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the center console and on the floor between the door and the seat on the driver’s side. Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the search was lawful under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement, holding the officer “was not obligated to forego or
stop a search because he had already found some evidence of wrongdoing,” and that
“seeing the contraband in plain view is sufficient to create probable cause to search for
additional contraband.” Id. at *2-3.
While the United States Supreme Court has cautioned about the limits of the
automobile exception and that, for example, “probable cause to believe that
undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search
of a suitcase,” Ross, 456 U.S. at 824, numerous jurisdictions have held that, where
officers observe or lawfully seize an open container in a vehicle, the automobile
exception permits a search of the rest of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. See,
e.g. United States v. McGuire, 957 F.2d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1992) (after discovering that
motorist was transporting open container of alcohol in violation of Illinois law, officer
was authorized under the automobile exception in “search[ing] every part of the vehicle
and its contents that could conceal additional contraband, including the area beneath the
passenger seat and the trunk”); United States v. Smith, 2014 WL 116368, *5 (M.D. Ala.
2014) (search of vehicle justified under automobile exception where officer observed an
open beer container in plain view in center console); People v. Hill, 929 P.2d 735, 739740 (Colo. 1996) (search of vehicle justified under automobile exception where
observation of “open beer bottles in the vehicle’s center console and a partially open
twelve-pack of beer in the vehicle’s back seat …. gave the officers probable cause to
believe that the open alcohol container law had been violated”); State v. Collard, 414
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N.W.2d 733, 735-736 (Minn. App. 1988) (officer justified in searching remainder of
passenger compartment after observing open bottle of beer in plain view on floor of car
in front of driver’s seat).
In this case, the district court concluded that the automobile exception did not
justify the officer’s search of the glove box. (R., pp.88-89.) It appears that the court’s
conclusion was based on a determination that the state failed to demonstrate that the
officer had probable cause to search the glove box specifically. The court found that the
state lacked “probable cause to search the glove box,” that “no reasonable person, based
on these facts, would conclude that an open container would be present in the glove box,”
and that “no magistrate, presented with these facts, would have found probable cause to
support issuing a search warrant.” (Id.) The district court thus applied an incorrect legal
standard, because, as noted above, once an officer has lawfully discovered that a vehicle
contains contraband, he may search any portion of the vehicle where “such contraband
might reasonably be found” or which “may conceal the object of the search.” Anderson,
2015 WL 7204541 at *2.
In its order denying the state’s motion for reconsideration, the district court first
lamented that “[t]his case takes a place in the long line of cases that begin with a law
enforcement traffic stop for minor or innocuous reasons, but then culminates in a
warrantless roadside search of an entire motor vehicle.” (R., p.123 (footnote omitted).)
However, regardless of whether a misdemeanor open container violation is, in the district
court’s view, “minor or innocuous,” an open container of alcohol in a vehicle is, under
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Idaho law, contraband, 4 and does, for the reasons set forth above, justify a warrantless
search of the vehicle. The district court then concluded again that the state failed to
provide a “factual basis” that the “mere presence” of the open container gave rise to an
“objectively reasonable belief that the vehicle contain[ed] additional bottles of opened
alcohol.” (Id.) Finally, the court appeared to analyze the officers’ subjective motives for
the search, and concluded that “[l]ike most warrantless roadside searches of motor
vehicles, this was one in search of whatever law enforcement could find, not something
specific they had reasonable expectation of finding.”

(R., p.124.)

The court thus

ultimately failed to determine the specific relevant issue of this case utilizing the correct
legal standard, i.e., whether the glove box was a part of the vehicle where an open
container, objectively, “might reasonably be found” or which “may conceal” an open
container. Anderson, 2015 WL 7204541 at *2; State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922
P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996) (“When reviewing an officer’s actions the court must judge the
facts against an objective standard.”).
Application of the correct legal standards, as set forth in Anderson, Gallegos,
Gibson, and Ross, demonstrate that the officers had lawful authority under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement to search the glove box. Upon finding
an open container in plain view, and other empty alcohol containers in the back seat, the
glove box (which is easily accessible to the driver of a vehicle), became an area of the car
where “such contraband might reasonably be found” or which “may conceal the object of
the search.” This is especially true in this case where Deputy Martin testified that he had

4

Subject to certain exceptions not applicable in this case, it is a misdemeanor for a person
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle to “possess any open beverage containing
alcoholic liquor, … beer …, or wine.” I.C. § 23-505(2).
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found open containers of alcohol in glove boxes in the past, that he observed Daily
reaching over towards the passenger side of the truck while Deputy Martin was in his
patrol vehicle, and the circumstantial evidence indicating that Daily locked the glove box
during the traffic stop. (Tr., p.16, Ls.15-19; p.18, L.14 – p.19, L.4; p.20, L.17 – p.21, L.5;
p.25, Ls.5-15.)
The district court erred by applying an incorrect legal standard and by granting
Daily’s motion to suppress. This Court should therefore vacate the district court’s orders
granting Daily’s motion to suppress and denying the state’s motion for reconsideration.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to vacate the district court’s order
granting Daily’s motion to suppress and the district court’s order denying the state’s
motion for reconsideration, and to remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 29th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Mark W. Olson__________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of December, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by emailing an electronic
copy to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.
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